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An Incentive Theory of Matching 
 
This paper presents a theory explaining the labor market matching process through 
microeconomic incentives. There are heterogeneous variations in the characteristics of 
workers and jobs, and firms face adjustment costs in responding to these variations. Matches 
and separations are described through firms' job offer and firing decisions and workers' job 
acceptance and quit decisions. This approach obviates the need for a matching function. On 
this theoretical basis, we argue that the matching function is vulnerable to the Lucas critique. 
Our calibrated model for the U.S. economy can account for important empirical regularities 
that the conventional matching model cannot. 
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 1 Introduction
The literature on search and matching in the labor market rests heavily on the assumption of
a stable matching function (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). According to Pissarides (2000,
p. 3-4), the matching function aims to summarize ￿heterogeneities, frictions and information
imperfections￿ and represent ￿the implications of the costly trading process without the
need to make the heterogeneities and the other features that give rise to it explicit.￿Various
authors (e.g. Lagos (2000)) have noted that policies which a⁄ect labor market heterogeneities
(e.g. retraining programs), frictions (e.g. job counselling) and information imperfections (e.g.
job exchanges) may naturally be expected to in￿ uence the matching function. In short, there
is no reason to believe that the matching function is invariant with respect to labor market
policies that are designed to improve the matching process.1 Beyond that, there are a wide
variety of labor and macroeconomic shocks (e.g. information technology and productivity
shocks, variations in hiring, training and ￿ring costs) that also a⁄ect the matching process
and thereby can in￿ uence the matching function. Under these various circumstances, the
matching function may run afoul of the Lucas critique.
This paper addresses this problem by proposing a new approach to the matching process
that obviates the need for a matching function. Alternatively, this approach can also be
viewed as an attempt to provide more insight into the determinants of labor market match-
ing. Our analysis suggests that the matching function is not stable with respect to policies
that a⁄ect matching frictions and, beyond that, not stable with respect to various macro-
economic shocks, calling into question the usefulness of assuming stable matching functions
in macroeconomic models. On this account, we argue that in analyzing the e⁄ects of many
labor policies and other macroeconomic shocks, the matching function may be relinquished
in favor of a choice-theoretic framework that covers the microeconomic decisions underlying
the matching process.
This paper provides a framework of this sort. We present two simple models of hetero-
geneous variations in the characteristics workers and jobs, combined with adjustment costs
in responding to these variations. In this context, we derive the job o⁄er and ￿ring decisions
of ￿rms and the job acceptance and quit decisions of workers, and show how these decisions
generate labor market matches and separations. Needless to say, we make no attempt to
be comprehensive in covering the wide variety of frictions that are prevalent in labor mar-
kets, but we believe that our analysis is su¢ cient to clarify a general modeling strategy for
moving beyond the matching function and to indicate how this strategy could be extended
1Several empirical studies indicate instabilities of the matching function. Very often a negative time trend
is found when estimating the search and matching function, thus casting doubt on the stability through time
(Blanchard and Diamond (1989) for the United States, and Fahr and Sunde (2001, 2004) for Germany).
1to other areas. Our analysis may be called an incentive theory of matching, since it enables
us to explain the microeconomic decisions relevant to the matching process in terms of the
incentives that economic agents face.
We calibrate our incentive model for the U.S. economy and show that it can account
for some important empirical regularities that the conventional matching model cannot.
First, our model generates labor market volatilities that are close to what can be found
in the empirical data, speci￿cally for the unemployment rate, the job ￿nding rate and the
separation rate. This is remarkable, as we do not rely on any type of real wage rigidity.
Instead, our calibration permits us to replicate the stylized fact that wages are as volatile
as productivity (see, for example, Hornstein et al., 2005). The standard calibration of the
conventional matching model2 is unable to generate these high volatilities of labor market
variables (see Shimer, 2005). Second, it generates a strong negative correlation between
the job ￿nding rate and the unemployment rate. And third, it can account for a strong
negative correlation between job creation and job destruction. The standard calibrations of
the matching model, with endogenous job destruction (see Krause and Lubik, 2007), cannot
account for these last two stylized facts.3
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the conceptual issues
underlying our approach to matching. Section 3 sets the stage by presenting a particularly
simple and transparent incentive model of matching. Section 4 presents an extended incentive
model. Section 5 discusses the calibration strategy. Section 6 presents the numerical results
and Section 7 concludes.
2 Conceptual Issues
The matching function is aptly rationalized by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001, p. 390):
￿The attraction of the matching function is that it enables the modeling of frictions in
otherwise conventional models, with a minimum of added complexity. Frictions derive from
information imperfections about potential trading partners, heterogeneities, the absence of
perfect insurance markets, slow mobility, congestion from large numbers, and other similar
2The ￿standard￿calibration of the model excludes rigid wages and small surplus calibrations. Although
the rigid wage version of the search and matching model can also generate higher volatilities (Hall, 2005), it
implies that counterfactual prediction that wages are acyclical. Thus we do not make this assumption here.
We also do not rely on Hagedorn and Manvoskii￿ s (2008) small surplus calibration, in which the average
unemployed worker is basically indi⁄erent between working and not working. In the calibrated version of our
model, the current period￿ s utility of an average unemployed is only about 80% of the utility of an employed.
3The search and matching model with exogenous job destruction actually has a strong negative correlation
between the job ￿nding rate and the unemployment (see Shimer, 2005). However, there is an intensive
debate in the literature whether separations are exogenous or not (see, for example, Hall, 2006, and Fujita
and Ramey, 2009, for opposing views). Separations are endogenous in our analysis.
2factors.￿Furthermore, they explain ￿the matching function summarizes a trading technology
between agents who place advertisements, read newspapers and magazines, go to employment
agencies, and mobilize local networks that eventually bring them together into productive
matches. The key idea is that this complicated exchange process is summarized by a well-
behaved function that gives the number of jobs formed at any moment in time in terms of
the number of workers looking for jobs, the number of ￿rms looking for workers, and a small
number of other variables￿(p. 391).
Shimer (2007, p. 1074) makes an insightful distinction between search and mismatch:
￿According to search theory, unemployed workers have left their old jobs and are actively
searching for a new employer. In contrast, his dynamic model of mismatch emphasizes that
unemployed workers are attached to an occupation and a geographic location in which jobs
are currently scarce. Mismatch is a theory of former steel workers remaining near a closed
plant in the hope that it reopens. Search ... is a theory of former steel workers moving to a
new city to look for positions as nurses.￿While this distinction is undoubtedly important, it
is worth emphasizing that adjustment costs are responsible for both mismatch and search.
The reason that the former steel workers remain near the closed plant is that the cost of
adjusting to another job (net of the expected bene￿ts) is greater than the cost of waiting
for the plant to open (again net of the expected bene￿ts). Moreover, if the former steel
workers can￿ t ￿nd jobs as nurses despite the existence of nursing vacancies, then the reason
is that either it was too costly for the workers to ￿nd the available vacancies or it was too
costly for the employers to ￿nd the available workers. So, under both mismatch and search,
unemployed workers and vacancies coexist because it is too costly to ￿ll the vacancies with
the unemployed workers. Otherwise, obviously, the match would have been made. Under
mismatch, the costs are frequently large and persistent, whereas under search they are often
small and transient; but the fact remains that adjustment costs are responsible for the friction
in both cases.
Our point of departure is to investigate the role of these adjustment costs as a source
of labor market frictions. The adjustment costs of course come in many guises. Some are
costs of geographic and occupational mobility (as in Shimer￿ s analysis); others are costs
of obtaining the relevant information (the standard search costs, e.g. costs of advertising,
monitoring, screening).
The most straightforward way to account for the coexistence of employed and unemployed
workers alongside ￿lled and un￿lled jobs is by invoking heterogeneities of workers or jobs.
Some workers are o⁄ered employment because they are su¢ ciently pro￿table (net of the
￿rm￿ s adjustment costs); others remain unemployed because their are insu¢ ciently pro￿table
(under these adjustment costs). These di⁄erences may arise since workers di⁄er in terms
3of their productivities, their costs of being identi￿ed as searching and employable, their
relocation and training costs, etc. In the same vein, some job o⁄ers are accepted because
they o⁄er su¢ cient remuneration (net of the potential job holder￿ s adjustment costs); others
are rejected because they are not su¢ ciently remunerative (net of adjustment costs). These
di⁄erences may exist because jobs di⁄er in terms of job productivities (due to capital and
technologies attached to the job), costs of being identi￿ed as vacant, etc. Our analysis focuses
on such heterogeneities.
In many conventional search models that use a matching function, workers and jobs
are treated as if each group were homogeneous and randomly matched. We do not wish
to imply that random selection among homogeneous workers and homogeneous jobs does
not occur; and when it does, matching functions come into their own.4 But we do suggest
that random selection occurs far more rarely in practice than the conventional search theory
assumes. Instead, the random selection of workers and vacancies implicitly described by
matching functions is largely a short-hand that economists use for dealing with their own
imperfect information. Workers who look indistinguishable to the economists are rarely
indistinguishable in terms of all the characteristics relevant for job acquisition and thus ￿rms￿
choices among workers is rarely completely random. Similarly for vacancies. Heterogeneities
of workers and jobs naturally play a pervasive role in explaining why some workers ￿nd
jobs and others do not and some vacancies are ￿lled while others remain vacant. It is these
heterogeneities, characterized in a simple way, on which our analysis focuses attention.
While various other authors have modeled the matching process without resorting to a
matching function (e.g. Hall (1977), Lagos (2000), Shimer (2007) and others), our analysis
explicitly focuses on two-sided search (i.e. search by both workers and ￿rms at the same time)
and an optimizing framework that makes a matching function super￿ uous. Due to our focus
on heterogeneities and adjustment costs, it is not necessary for our analysis to make a sharp
distinction between search and mismatch. Our analysis is meant to cover both phenomena,
depending on how we choose to interpret the nature of the heterogeneities and adjustment
costs. In this context, as noted above, we show that our analysis can explain various stylized
facts that are not accounted for in the convential search and matching literature.
3 A Simple, Illustrative Model
To set the stage, we begin by constructing a particularly simple model of the incentive theory
of matching, based on heterogeneous jobs and workers. Our model has the following sequence
4Even when a worker selects jobs with the same advertised characteristics in a newspaper, the selection
may not be random due to perceived job heterogeneities: some vacancy adds are easier to spot than others.
4of labor market decisions. First, the realized values of the shocks are revealed. Second, the
￿rms make their hiring and ￿ring decisions and the households make their job acceptance
and refusal decisions, of course taking the wage as given. Unemployed workers search for
jobs; employed workers do not.
For simplicity, we will not consider vacancies in our model. While it is of course possible
to include them (as illustrated brie￿ y below), doing so would complicate our analysis without
amplifying the basic point of this paper, namely, to describe the matching process without
need for a matching function, which is vulnerable to the Lucas critique. Beyond that, it
is worth noting that vacancy data is the Achilles￿heal of conventional empirical matching
models. For U.S. long time series, we have only a very rough proxy for vacancies, namely,
the Conference Board help-wanted advertising index, measuring the number of help-wanted
ads in 51 major newspapers. Over the past decade, this index shows a clear downward
trend (adjusting for the business cycle), which may well be due to internet advertising.
Although an internet advertising index exists, it is far from clear how this index can be made
comparable to the newspaper index. Moreover, while the Conference Board advertising index
and the JOLTS survey on vacanices exhibit similar dynamics for the limited sample periods
in which comparable data sets are available (Shimer (2005)), it appears, surprisingly, that
the number of vacancies (as de￿ned by the JOLTS survey) is consistently and substantially
smaller than the number of new hires! There are two obvious reasons why this should be
so, both highlighting weakenesses of vacancies data: (i) Only a fraction of the jobs that
get ￿lled are preceeded by vacancy postings. (The matching function has nothing to say
about the many hires that occur without formal advertising.) (ii) The JOLTS survey, like all
other surveys, ignores high-frequency vacancy movements. In particular, JOLTS measures
end-of-month reported job openings, not job openings that get ￿lled before the month is
over. Overall, such considerations indicate that vacancy data is much less reliable than the
other data (e.g. unemployment rates, productivity) used in conventional empirical matching
models. On account of this as well as analytical simplicity, our incentive model will not cover
vacancies.
To keep our analysis as simple as possible, we shall assume in this section that the real
wage w is exogenously given. It is easy to extend the model to include wage bargaining,
along the lines usually presented in the standard matching models, but this would complicate
our analysis without adding new insights. On this account, we forego a model of wage
determination in this section. The wage will, however, be endogenized in the extended
model of the next section.
Furthermore, to provide a maximally transparent comparison of our incentive model and
the standard matching model, let us assume that workers and ￿rms are myopic (i.e. their
5rates of time discount are 100%). This assumption will be relaxed later.
3.1 The Firm￿ s Behavior
We assume that the pro￿t generated by a particular worker at a particular job is subject to a
random shock ", which is meant to capture idiosyncratic variations in workers￿suitability for
the available jobs. For example, workers in a particular skill group and sector may exhibit
heterogeneous pro￿tabilities due to random variations in their state of health, levels of con-
centration, and mobility costs, or to random variations in ￿rms￿operating costs, screening,
training, and monitoring costs, and so on. In short, the random shock " is a short-hand for
workplace heterogeneities. It is iid across workers, with a stable probability density function
G" ("), known to the ￿rm.5 Let the corresponding cumulative distribution be C" ("). The
period of analysis is equal to the period between successive realizations of ".
The average productivity of each worker is a, a positive constant. The hiring cost h per
worker is a constant. The pro￿t generated by an entrant (a newly hired worker) is
￿
E = a ￿ " ￿ w ￿ h, (1)
where the superscript ￿E￿stands for ￿entrant￿and w is the real wage.
The ￿rm￿ s ￿job o⁄er incentive￿(its payo⁄from hiring a worker) is the di⁄erence between
its gross pro￿t6 from hiring an entrant worker (a ￿ w ￿ h) and its pro￿t from not doing
(namely, zero):
￿
E = a ￿ w ￿ h. (2)
The ￿rm o⁄ers this job to a worker whenever that worker generates positive pro￿t: " < ￿E.






The ￿rm￿ s ￿retention incentive￿ (its payo⁄ from retaining a worker) is the di⁄erence
between its gross pro￿t from retaining a worker is (a ￿ w) and the (negative) pro￿t from
￿ring that worker:
￿
I = a ￿ w + f, (4)
where the superscript ￿I￿stands for the incumbent employee who has been retained, and
f is the ￿ring cost per worker, assumed constant. The ￿rm with a ￿lled job will ￿re an
5Our analysis can of course be extended straightforwardly to shocks with AR and MA components. For
mobility costs, the shocks are often serially correlated in practice.
6This "gross" pro￿t is the expected pro￿t generated by hiring an unemployed worker, without taking the
operating cost into account.
6incumbent worker whenever she generates negative pro￿t: " > ￿I. Thus the ￿ring rate is:





Note that due to the hiring and ￿ring costs, the retention incentive exceeds the job o⁄er
incentive (￿I > ￿E) and thus the retention rate exceeds the job o⁄er rate ((1 ￿ ￿) > ￿).
3.2 The Worker￿ s Behavior
The worker faces a discrete choice of whether or not to work. If she works, her disutility
of work e⁄ort is e, which is a random variable with a stable probability density function
Ge (e), known to the worker. The corresponding cumulative distribution is Ce (e). The
random variable captures heterogeneities in the disagreeability of work, due to such factors
as temporary variations in health, moods, idiosyncratic reactions to particular workplaces,
and personal circumstances. If the worker does not work, her utility is b (a constant). Her
utility is linear in consumption and work e⁄ort.7 She consumes all her income. Thus the
utility of an employed worker is V N = w ￿ e, and the utility of an unemployed worker is
V U = b.
A worker￿ s ￿work incentive￿(her payo⁄from choosing to work) is the di⁄erence between
her gross utility from working (w) and her utility from not working (b):
￿ = (w ￿ b). (6)
Assuming that w > b and letting E (e) = 0; all unemployed workers have an ex ante incentive
to seek work.
An unemployed worker will accept a job o⁄er whenever e < ￿. This means that the job
acceptance rate is
￿ = Ce (￿). (7)
Along the same lines, an employed worker will decide to quit when e > ￿. This means
that the quit rate is
￿ = 1 ￿ Ce (￿). (8)
Note that, for simplicity, we have assumed that the job acceptance rate is identical to
the job retention rate (￿ = 1 ￿ ￿). When unemployed workers face costs of adjusting to
7Observe that on the ￿rm￿ s side, we distinguish between entrants (E) and incumbent workers (I); whereas
on the workers￿side, we distinguish between employed (N) and unemployed (U) workers. The rationale for
these two distinctions is that the ￿rm can hire two types of workers (entrants and incumbents), whereas the
worker can be in two states (employment and unemployment).
7employment (e.g. buying a car to get to work, or psychic costs of changing one￿ s daily
routine) or when employed workers face costs of adjusting to unemployment (e.g. building
networks of friends with potential job contacts, psychic costs of adjusting to joblessness),
then the job acceptance rate would fall short of the job retention rate.8
3.3 Employment
An unemployed worker gets a job when two conditions are ful￿lled: (i) she receives a job
o⁄er and (ii) she accepts that o⁄er. Thus the match probability (￿) is the product of the job
o⁄er rate (￿) and the job acceptance rate (￿):
￿ = ￿￿. (9)
Consequently the number of unemployed workers who get jobs in period t is ￿U￿1, where
U￿1 is the number of unemployed in the previous period.9
An employee separates from her job when at least one of two conditions is satis￿ed: (i)
she is ￿red or (ii) she quits. Thus the separation probability is
￿ = ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿. (10)
This implies that the number of employed who separate from their jobs in period t is
￿N￿1, where N￿1 is the number of employed in the previous period.
The change in employment is ￿N = N ￿ N￿1 = ￿U￿1 ￿ ￿N￿1. The labor force L is
assumed constant. Thus U = L ￿ N and employment may be described by
N = ￿U￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)N￿1 = ￿L + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)N￿1. (11)
Expressing the equation in terms of the employment rate, n = N=L, yields the following
employment equation:
n = ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)n￿1. (12)
Although we have not included vacancies in our model - since doing so would complicate
our analysis without contributing substantially to our main message - it is worth noting that
8Speci￿cally, for example, the unemployed worker￿ s job acceptance incentive could be expressed as ￿U =
w ￿ b ￿ ￿
U , where ￿
U is the cost of adjusting to employment, and the incumbent worker￿ s job retention
incentive could be expressed as ￿N = w ￿b+￿
N, where ￿
N is the cost of adjusting to unemployment. Then
the job acceptance rate becomes ￿ = Ce
￿
￿U￿
, the job retention rate becomes Ce
￿
￿N￿
so that the quit rate




9All other variables (without subscripts) refer to the current period.
8vacancies could be included straightforwardly as an instrument, whereby ￿rms manipulate
their employment adjustment costs. See Appendix A for a simple example.
3.4 The Matching-Function Representation
We now juxtapose the model above with its matching-function counterpart in order to in-
vestigate the stability of the matching function. For this purpose, let us assume that the
model above describes the real world, and then let us ask how the behavior of this model can
be replicated by a corresponding model containing a matching function. We will show that
such replication cannot occur unless the matching function changes whenever the underlying
parameters of the model change. These parameter changes include macroeconomic variables
(such as productivity, a) and policy variables (such as unemployment bene￿ts, underlying
the parameter b). Thus, in this analytical context, the matching function runs afoul of the
Lucas critique: policy analysis and comparative static prediction on the basis of a stable
matching function would yield misleading results.
Naturally, the incentive model above is extremely simple, but it is precisely this simplicity
that allows us to bring the Lucas critique of the matching function into sharp relief. Needless
to say, the same critique can be formulated with respect to more complicated models (such as
the one in the next section), since the underlying idea is quite general: For any given matching
function - speci￿ed independently of the optimizing decisions relevant to the matching process
- it is always possible to contruct a microfounded macro model that systematically fools this
matching function. In this sense, the di¢ culty of the matching functions is analogous to that
of expectation-generating mechanisms in traditional macro models that were incompatible
with rational expectations.
Let the matching function be
x = x(u;v), (13)
where u is the unemployment rate and vt is the vacancy rate (number of vacant jobs relative
to the labor force). This function satis￿es the standard conditions: xi > 0, xii < 0, i = u;v;
x(u;0) = x(0;v) = 0; and there are constant returns to scale: gx(u;v) = x(gu;gv) where g
is a positive constant.
Let ￿ = v=u denote labor market tightness, so that q (￿) = x(u=v;1) is the probability
that a job is matched with a worker, and ￿q (￿) is the probability that a worker is matched
by a job. Along the lines of the simple labor market matching models, we assume that jobs
are destroyed at an exogenous rate ￿, 0 < ￿ < 1: Then the change in the employment rate
9is10 ￿n = ￿q (￿)(1 ￿ n￿1) ￿ ￿n￿1, implying the following employment dynamics equation:
n = ￿q (￿) + (1 ￿ ￿q (￿) ￿ ￿)n￿1. (14)
Vacancies are posted until the expected pro￿t is reduced to zero: a￿w = ￿
q(￿), where ￿ is
a vacancy posting cost, ￿=q (￿) is the expected vacancy posting cost per worker. Expressing







where g = q￿1.
The equilibrium employment rate n is obtained by substituting the zero-pro￿t condition
(15) into the employment dynamics equation (14).
3.5 Equivalence Conditions
In order for the two models to be comparable, let the exogenous wage w be identical in both
models and suppose that the separation rate ￿ in the incentive model is a constant equal
to the job destruction rate ￿ in the conventional matching model. Then the two models are
observationally equivalent when ￿q (￿)+(1 ￿ ￿q (￿) ￿ ￿)nt￿1 = ￿+(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)nt￿1, so that
￿q (￿) = ￿, (16)








= C" (a ￿ w ￿ h)Ce (w ￿ b). (17)




























10To keep this model comparable with our the simple incentive model above, we assume (without loss of
generality) the same timing in both models. Matches are not destroyed in the match period and they become
immediately productive.




It is clear that the conditions (18) - (20) are mutually exclusive: they cannot be ful￿lled
simultaneously. By assumption, the matching function is a shorthand for heterogeneities and
frictions addressed explicitly in the incentive model of matching. It is a useful shorthand if
it can be shown that (i) it is observationally equivalent to explicit model of the underlying
heterogeneities and frictions and (ii) it is stable with respect to the macroeconomic and policy
variables whose e⁄ects the matching model aims to analyze (to avoid the Lucas critique).
The comparison above indicates that these two conditions are not satis￿ed. The standard
matching model cannot reproduce the labor market dynamics of the incentive model above.
This non-equivalence is not a special case to be ascribed to the particular speci￿cation of the
incentive model. It is easy to see that the reasoning above is applicable to a broad family of
models.
The source of the non-equivalence is analogous to the non-equivalence of adaptive-
expectations and rational-expectatons macro models. Adaptive-expectations models were
unable to reproduce the dynamics of rational-expectations models because, for any given
function specifying adaptive expectations, it is always possible to ￿nd a hypothetically ￿true￿
stochastic generating process which produces predictable errors, that is, errors not reconcil-
able with rational expectations. Along the same lines, the comparison above makes clear
that for any given matching function, it is always possible to ￿nd a hypothetically ￿true￿
model of the underlying heterogeneities and frictions which produces labor market dynamics
that cannot be replicated through the matching function. Just as an expectations generating
mechanism that is speci￿ed a priori (independently of the underlying macro model) is not
a reliable tool for investigating the in￿ uence of macro policy, so a matching function that is
speci￿ed a priori is also not a reliable tool to explore the in￿ uence of labor market policy.
The same can be said regarding the in￿ uence of other macro and labor parameters.
Alternatively, we can say that the matching function is not stable with respect to the
parameters whose in￿ uence the matching models are meant to analyze. If the incentive
model above is assumed to be the ￿true￿ model of the labor market, then the standard
matching model can reproduce the ￿true￿employment e⁄ects of variations in all the relevant
parameters - the wage w, productivity a, the hiring cost h, or the leisure utility b - only if
we assume that the matching function is modi￿ed whenever these parameters are changed.
This instability of the matching function makes it an inappropriate tool for investigating the
e⁄ectiveness of policy changes or macroeconomic ￿ uctuations.
11Although the simple model above is useful to examine why the matching function is
subject to the Lucas critique, we now need to relax several restrictive assumptions of the
incentive model above - that households and ￿rms are myopic, wages are exogenous, and
productivity is constant - in order to examine the relative performance of the incentive model
and the standard matching model in accounting for well-known stylized facts. In the context
of conventional calibrations, we will show that the incentive model fares better than the
standard matching model in reproducing the volatilities of major labor market variables.
4 An Extended Incentive Model
We now extend the simple model above by
￿ including aggregate risk: the average aggregate productivity parameter a is now subject
to random productivity shocks;
￿ allowing for rates of time discount that are less than 100%, so that workers and ￿rms
become intertemporal optimizers and
￿ introducing wage determination through bargaining.
The ￿rst extension enables us to simulate productivity shocks as done in Hall (2005),
Shimer (2005) and numerous other papers and to make our framework quantitatively com-
parable to the matching theory. The second and third extensions provide a richer depiction
of the determinants of employment and wages.
In this context, the new sequence of decisions may be summarized as follows. First,
the aggregate productivity shock and the idiosyncratic shocks are revealed. Second, the
wage is set through bargaining. Third, the ￿rms make their hiring and ￿ring decisions and
the households make their job acceptance and refusal decisions, taking the wage and the
realization of the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks as given.
4.1 The Firm￿ s Behavior
Since the ￿rm is not myopic in this model, its hiring and ￿ring decisions depend on its
expected pro￿ts not only in the current time period, but also in future time periods.
124.1.1 The Firing Decision
The expected present value of pro￿t generated by an incumbent employee, after the random













































is the expectation of the random term ", conditional on this shock falling short
of the incumbent employee￿ s retention incentive ￿I
t, which is de￿ned as
￿
I







i.e. the retention incentive is the di⁄erence between the gross expected pro￿t from retaining
the employed worker
￿





and the expected pro￿t from ￿ring her (￿f).
An incumbent worker is ￿red in period t when the realized value of the random cost "t
is greater than the incumbent worker employment incentive: "t > ￿I
t. Since the cumulative





, the employed worker￿ s ￿ring rate is







4.1.2 The Job O⁄er Decision















We de￿ne the ￿rm￿ s expected job o⁄er incentive ￿E
t as the di⁄erence between the gross
















11In the ￿rst period, pro￿t is (at ￿ wt ￿ "t); in the second period, the worker is retained with probability
(1 ￿ ￿t) and then generates an expected pro￿t of at ￿ wt, and the worker is ￿red with a probability of ￿t
and then generates a ￿ring cost of ft; and so on.
13A job is o⁄ered when ￿E








4.2 The Worker￿ s Behavior
The incumbent worker￿ s expected present value of utility ex post (once the realized value of





















is the expected present value of utility of the following period (before the






































An unemployed￿ s expected ￿work incentive￿￿t (the incentive for an unemployed to accept
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Thus the unemployed accepts a job o⁄er when et < Et
￿
~ V N
t ￿ V U
t
￿
, so that et <
￿t.Consequently, the job acceptance rate is
￿t = Ce (￿t). (32)
The incumbent worker decides to quit his job when the present value of becoming unem-











his expected work incentive is lower than the utility cost et > Et
￿
~ V N
t ￿ V U
t
￿
= ￿t. Thus the
12The employed worker￿ s "gross" expected present value from working is the employed worker￿ s expected
present value of utility without taking the utility shock into account.
14quit rate is
￿t = 1 ￿ Ce (￿t). (33)
4.3 Employment
As in the previous model, the match probability is
￿t = ￿t￿t, (34)
and the separation probability is
￿t = ￿t + ￿t ￿ ￿t￿t, (35)
and the associated employment dynamics equation is
nt = ￿t + (1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t)nt￿1 (36)
where the employment persistence parameter (1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t) depends inversely on the match
probability ￿t and the separation probability ￿t. An alternative interpretation of the persis-
tence parameter is given by
1 ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿t = (1 ￿ ￿t)(1 ￿ ￿t) ￿ ￿t￿t, (37)
where (1 ￿ ￿t)(1 ￿ ￿t), the product of the incumbents￿retention rate and staying rate, is
the incumbents￿survival rate. Thus the persistence parameter is the di⁄erence between the
incumbents￿survival rate and the unemployed workers￿match probability.
4.4 Wage Determination
We now endogenize the real wage through bargaining. The conventional matching models
assume that the real wage is the outcome of Nash bargaining, which takes place after the
match has been made. This sequence of decisions is conceptually problematic, particularly
when match productivities are heterogeneous. Should not the ￿rms￿and workers￿incentives
to match depend on the wage o⁄ered? If workers and jobs di⁄er in terms of their produc-
tivities, will not a change in the wage lead to a change in the number of matches that are
productive? In practice, of course, we don￿ t ￿nd workers and ￿rms agreeing to match before
the terms of the employment contract have been set.
This di¢ culty is easy to overlook in the conventional matching models, where matches
are generated mechanically through a matching function, all matches generate a bargain-
15ing surplus, and this bargaining surplus is shared by the worker and the ￿rm through the
subsequent wage negotiation. But once the matching process is endogenized in terms of the
worker￿ s and ￿rm￿ s incentive to match - as is done in our incentive model - the di¢ culty
comes into sharp relief. Then we see that the match probability depends on the ￿rm￿ s job
o⁄er rate and the worker￿ s job acceptance rate, and these rates in turn depend on the wage.
Similarly, the separation probability depends on the ￿rm￿ s ￿ring rate and the worker￿ s quit
rate, and these rates are also wage-dependent. In this context, it is clear that the num-
ber of matches made and destroyed per period of time cannot be determined without prior
knowledge of the wage.
On this account, we assume here that wage bargaining takes place before the job o⁄er,
acceptance, ￿ring and quit decisions are made. Our aim is to formulate a wage determination
model that is (i) simple and tractable, (ii) comparable to the wage bargaining process in the
conventional matching models (with the exception of the timing issue above) and (iii) able to
reproduce the stylized fact that wages are as volatile as productivity. For this purpose, we let
the incumbent workers and entrants receive the same wage wt,13 determined through Nash
bargaining between the ￿rm and its median incumbent worker. The median worker faces
no risk of dismissal, as he is at the middle of the " distribution. These assumptions satisfy
the three aims above, because (i) the simplify the analysis by allowing the employment rate
to depend on the wage, but not vice versa, (ii) the Nash bargaining between the ￿rm and
the median incumbent is comparable to the wage bargaining in the conventional matching
models, and (iii) the negotiated wage turns out to be as volatile as productivity.
Needless to say, other models of wage negotiations could be incorporated into our analysis
(e.g. individualistic wage bargaining, monopoly union wage setting, separate wage negotia-
tions for incumbents and entrants, etc.), but we do not do so here since they would substan-
tially complicate the model,14 without a⁄ecting the main points of our analysis, namely, that
the matching and separation rates can be determined endogenously through the job o⁄er,
job acceptance, ￿ring and quit decisions, and that these decisions are not replicable through
a stable matching function.
The wage bargain takes place in each period of analysis. In the current period t, under
13This assumption also implies that an increase in wages leads to a fall in employment. This employment
e⁄ect can of course also be generated when incumbent workers and entrants have di⁄erent wages. For exam-
ple, Lindbeck and Snower (2001) provide a variety of reasons why entrants do not receive their reservation
wage and thus a rise in incumbent workers￿wages is not met a counterveiling fall in entrant wages, and
thus a rise in incumbent workers￿wage lead to a fall in employment. In the context of a Markov model,
Diaz-Vazquez and Snower (2003) show that incumbent workers￿wages are inversely related to aggregate
employment even when entrants receive their reservation wages.
14Wages would depend on the time path of employment, while employment depends on the time path of
wages.
16bargaining agreement, the median incumbent worker receives the wage wt incurs e⁄ort cost
eM and the ￿rm receives the expected pro￿t
￿
at ￿ wt ￿ "M ￿
in each period t. Thus the
expected present value of the median incumbent worker￿ s utility E(V M
































Under disagreement in bargaining, the incumbent worker￿ s fallback income is d, which
can be conceived as ￿nancial support from family and friends, strike pay out of a union
fund, or other forms of support. The ￿rm￿ s fallback pro￿t is ￿z, a constant. Assuming that
disagreement in the current period does not a⁄ect future returns, the present value of utility




























































= wt ￿ d ￿ e
M, (42)
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M + ft. (43)






at ￿ wt + z ￿ "
M ￿1￿￿
. (44)
17Thus the negotiated wage is
wt = ￿
￿
at + z ￿ "
M￿






where ￿ represents the bargaining strength of the incumbent worker relative to the ￿rm.
4.5 The Labor Market Equilibrium
The labor market equilibrium is the solution of the system comprising the following equa-
tions:
￿ Incentives: the incumbent worker retention incentive ￿I
t (eq. 23), the job o⁄er incentive
￿E
t (eq. 26), the work incentive ￿t (eq. 31).
￿ Employment decisions: the ￿ring rate ￿t (eq. 24), and the job o⁄er rate ￿t (eq. 27).
￿ Work decisions: the job acceptance rate ￿t (eq. 32) and the quit rate ￿t (eq. 33).
￿ Match and separation probabilities: the match probability ￿t (eq. 34) and the separa-
tion probability ￿t (eq. 35).
￿ Employment and wage determination: the employment level Nt (eq. 36) and the ne-
gotiated wage wt (eq. 45).
5 Calibration
We now calibrate our incentive model for the US economy. The calibration is done on a
monthly basis. The simulation results are aggregated to quarterly frequency to make them
comparable to the empirical data, as for example in Shimer (2005). For the discount factor
￿ = 1
1+r we apply the real interest rate r = 1:041=12￿1: We normalize the average productivity
(a) to 1. As in Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005), we set b by applying a replacement rate of
￿ = 40% of the wage. For simplicity, we set d = b. As commonly found in the literature we
adopt a bargaining power parameter ￿ of 0:5.
Vacancy posting costs are usually set to around 30 percent of the quarterly productivity
in the conventional matching model calibrations. To make our calibration as comparable as
possible to conventional ones, we divide this number by the typical quarterly worker ￿nding
rate of 0:7 (see, e.g., Krause and Lubik, 2007 and Den Haan et al., 2000) to obtain the hiring
costs, h. This gives us a value of 43 percent of the quarterly productivity or roughly 130
percent of the monthly productivity.
18The literature does not provide reliable direct estimates of the magnitude of US ￿ring
costs. Thus we assess these costs indirectly. For this purpose, note that Belot et al. (2007)
provide index measures of employment protection for regular jobs in the US and UK, and
that Bentolila and Bertola (1990) provide estimates of the average magnitude of UK ￿ring
costs on a yearly basis.15 Assuming that the index measures of employment protection are
proportional to the estimates of the magnitude of ￿ring costs, we multiply the magnitude
of the UK ￿ring costs by the ratio of the US to the UK employment protection indeces to
derive a rough estimate of the magnitude of US ￿ring costs. Accordingly, the magnitude of
monthly US ￿ring costs, relative to productivity, is 0:08. The same exercise based on other
industrialized countries (France, Germany and Italy), however, yields higher estimates of
US ￿ring costs. Thus we choose a value of 0:1 for our baseline calibration, but provide a
robustness analysis for other values in Appendix B.16 For simplicity, we set the ￿rm￿ s fallback
pro￿t ￿z equal to￿f.17
We assume that the random pro￿tability term " and the utility shock e have cumulative
distributions given by logistic functions with scale factors s" and se and expected values ￿ "
and ￿ e, respectively.18 We calibrate our model such that it replicates the stylized fact that
a 1% increase of productivity is associated with about a 1% increase of wage.19 This is
achieved by setting ￿ e = 0:19. Thereby our calibration excludes the possibility that our
results are driven by real wage rigidity. We assign values to the remaining free parameters
of the model (￿ ", se, s") so as to replicate the following steady state values (summarized in
Table 1):20 The match probability ￿, which is the probability for a worker to ￿nd a new job
within one period, is calibrated to 45%21, as in Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manvoskii
(2008). The unemployment rate u is calibrated to 12%.22 According to our employment
dynamics equation (12) steady state unemployment is u =
￿
￿+￿ which implies a separation
rate of 6:14%. Based on Hall (2005), who shows that ￿res and quits have approximately the
same share in separation, we assume ￿rings to account for 50% of the separations, namely
￿ = 3:1%. Eq. (35) then yields the quit rate of ￿ = 3:2%. Since ￿ is equal to 1￿￿; the job
15We take averages over the time periods provided by these authors.
16Speci￿cally, we provide simulation results for ￿ring costs calculated relative to the UK, f = 0:08, and
as an upper bound we choose f = 0:2.
17Here we implicitly assume that during disagreement the incumbent worker imposes the maximal cost on
the ￿rm short of inducing dismissal.
18The cumulative logistic distribution is very close to the cumulative normal distribution.
19See Hornstein et al. (2005).
20Speci￿cally, the three parameters set ￿, ￿, and ￿. From these latter ￿ ow rates, the remaining rates can
be derived.
21Note: In our model the worker ￿nding rate (i.e., the probability of a ￿rm to ￿nd a new worker) and the
job ￿nding rate (i.e., the probability of a worker to ￿nd a new) are the same.
22This value also considers potential participants in the labor market such as discouraged workers and
workers loosely attached to the labor force, see Krause and Lubik (2007) and den Haan et al. (2000).
19acceptance rate is set at 96:8%: Recalling that ￿ = ￿￿; we ￿nd that the resulting job o⁄er
rate ￿ is 46:5%:
We normalize the autocorrelation (￿a) of the aggregate productivity shock and normalize
the standard error such that we obtain the empirical values for the autocorrelation and the
volatility of productivity in the model simulation below. Table 2 summarizes our calibrated
parameter values.
Variable In Words Steady State Value
u unemployment rate 0:120
￿ match probability 0:450
￿ hiring/job o⁄er rate 0:465
￿ separation rate 0:061
￿ ￿ring rate 0:031
￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ job quit rate 0:032
Table 1: Steady State Values
Parameter In Words Value
a productivity 1
￿ replacement rate b
w; d
w 0:4
f ￿ring cost 1:3
h hiring cost 0:1
￿ workers￿bargaining strength 0:5
r discount factor 0:997
￿z ￿rm￿ s fallback pro￿t ￿0:1
￿ e average value of leisure 0:17
￿ " average operating costs 0:465
s" scale factor of the cumulative distribution of "t 0:390
se scale factor of the cumulative distribution of et 0:078
￿a autocorrelation of the aggregate productivity shock 0:975
$a standard error of the aggregate productivity shock 0:007
Table 2: Parameter Values (Rounded to the Third Decimal)
6 Description of Results
6.1 Labor Market Volatilies
Costain and Reiter (2007) and Shimer (2005) point out that the conventional calibration of
the matching model is unable to replicate the volatility of the job ￿nding rate, the unem-
20ployment rate, and other labor market variables in response to productivity shocks. Table
3 shows that the empirical volatilities for the United States (from 1951-2003, HP ￿ltered
data with smoothing parameter 10000, as calculated by Shimer) are far greater than the
corresponding volatilities in response to productivity shocks, as generated by the simulation
of the conventional matching model (in its standard calibration, as calculated by Shimer).
U. Rate Match. Rate Sep. Rate Product.
Empirical Volatilities by Shimer (2005), from 1951-2003
Standard deviation 0.19 0.12 0.08 0.02
Relative to productivity 9.5 5.9 3.8 1
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.94 0.91 0.73 0.88
Volatilities by Shimer￿ s (2005) Search and Matching Model
Standard deviation 0.01 0.01 - 0.02
Relative to productivity 0.5 0.5 - 1
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.94 0.88 - 0.88
Table 3: Empirical Volatilities and Volatilities generated by the Search and Matching
Model from Shimer (2005).
To compare our model with the conventional matching theory, we use our baseline cali-
bration (with robustness checks in the Appendix B) to simulate our model for 200 quarters
(i.e. 600 months). We repeat this exercise 10,000 times and report the average of the macro-
economic volatilities (HP ￿ltered simulated data with smoothing parameter 10000) in Table
4.
U. Rate Match. Rate Sep. Rate Product.
Standard Calibration
Standard deviation 0.19 0.13 0.07 0.02
Relative to productivity 8.8 6 3.5 1
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.88
Table 4: Volatilities generated by the Incentive Model of Matching
The di⁄erences between our model and the conventional matching model are striking.
Our model can generate the high macroeconomic volatilities found in the data. Our results
are all the more remarkable, as we do not neither have to resort to Hall￿ s (2005) real wage
rigidity assumption nor to Hagedorn and Manovskii￿ s (2008) small surplus calibration.
Speci￿cally, the more rigid the wage in the conventional matching model (Hall, 2005), the
greater the share of productivity variations that is captured by the ￿rm and thus the greater
21the volatility of vacancies. However, there is evidence against the rigid-wage hypothesis both
from the microeconometric and the macro perspective. Haefke et al. (2008) show that wages
for newly created jobs (i.e., those modeled in the matching model) are completely ￿ exible on
a microeconomic level. Hornstein et al. (2005) point out that wages are roughly as volatile
as the labor productivity on a macroeconomic level. By contrast, our model generates high
labor market volatilities, even though it replicates the stylized fact that wages are as volatile
as productivity.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) choose a small-surplus calibration to resolve the volatil-
ity puzzle of the matching model. Under this calibration, aggregate pro￿ts are only a very
small share of the overall production in the steady state, so that a positive productivity
shock sharply increases the relative pro￿ts. This gives a large incentive to ￿rms to post more
vacancies (due to the free entry condition). Consequently all labor market variables become
volatile. This type of calibration has several shortcomings. Besides the unrealistically low
pro￿t share, the utility value of unemployment is extremely high and workers￿bargaining
power is very low in the calibration. Therefore workers are almost indi⁄erent between work-
ing and not working. We do not need to rely on any of these mechanisms in our calibration.
As noted, we assume that worker￿ s bargaining power is 50 percent. The labor income di-
vided by overall production is roughly 80 percent in our model. Furthermore, the average
worker￿ s disutility of labor and unemployment bene￿ts make up only 80 percent of the cur-
rent wage. As a consequence, the average worker is not indi⁄erent between unemployment
and employment.
6.2 Correlations
Our model features several additional advantages compared to the conventional matching
framework. Krause and Lubik (2007) show that the matching framework with endogenous
job destruction and ￿ exible wages cannot generate a strong negative correlation between
the job ￿nding rate and the unemployment. In all of our model simulations, the correlation
between these two variables is very strongly negative, in magnitude between -0.95 and -0.99,
i.e., slightly higher than in the US data (-0.95, see Shimer, 2005).
Further, Krause and Lubik (2007) show that the matching model with endogenous job
destruction and ￿ exible wages cannot account for the negative correlation between job de-
struction and job creation. In our model, the correlation between these two variables is
always negative and close to -1.23
23The job ￿nding rate and the job destruction rate are both driven by the same underlying shock, resulting
in this strong negative correlation. We could get a lower correlation if we introduced another shock to drive
a wedge between the shocks underlying job destruction and those underlying job creation. However, for
227 Conclusion
This paper has presented a theory of labor market matching that does not rely on a matching
function. Whereas the matching function is meant to encapsulate ￿heterogeneities, frictions
and information imperfections,￿ 24 we have presented models that depict these phenomena
explicitly within a simple analytical framework. In this context, we have shown that the
matching function is not stable with respect to conventional labor market policies and various
standard macroeconomic shocks. Thus the matching function is vulnerable to the Lucas
critique, and its use for policy analysis and prediction becomes problematic.
The general intuition is straightforward. Although it is often claimed that the match-
ing function is analogous to a production function, an important di⁄erence stands out. A
￿rm￿ s production function captures the portfolio of available technologies, and these are of-
ten invariant with respect to many government policies and macroeconomic variations. By
contrast, a matching function summarizes the upshot of the many individual decisions by
￿rms and workers, responding to their individual incentives to o⁄er, accept, quit and destroy
jobs, and these incentives are in general a⁄ected by policies and macro shocks. In this re-
spect, the matching function appears to face di¢ culty analogous to the adaptive expectations
hypothesis, which sought to predict expectations without reference to the actual stochastic
processes in the economy. Just as predictable changes in policies and and macroeconomic
variables could be expected to in￿ uence agents￿expectations, so these changes can also be
expected to in￿ uence agents￿incentives to generate labor market matches.
Our incentive theory provides a di⁄erent view of the matching process than that presented
by a matching function. Whereas the matching function depicts matches as the output of
a ￿matching technology￿that mechanically pairs unemployed workers and vacant ￿rms, the
incentive theory explains the matching probability in terms of the ￿rm￿ s job o⁄er incentive
and the worker￿ s job acceptance incentive. Similarly, the separation probability is explained
in terms of the ￿rm￿ s ￿ring incentive and the worker￿ s quit incentive. These incentives depend
on all the parameters of the model, including policy and macro parameters.
To keep our formal analysis as simple as possible, we have made some radically simplifying
assumptions, such as those concerning wage determination, the depiction of heterogeneities
in terms of only two additive shocks " and e, and the depiction of adjustment costs in terms
of only two additive costs h and f. Whereas these simplifying assumptions naturally a⁄ect
the quantitative predictions of our model, they are not essential to basic idea that motivates
this paper: namely, that the matching and separation probabilities can be understood in
simplicity we do not choose this option.
24Pissarides, 2000, p. 3.
23terms of job o⁄er, job acceptance, ￿ring, and quit probabilities, which may be derived from
the optimizing decisions of ￿rms and workers. This is the central contribution of this paper,
obviating the need for a matching function. These optimizing decisions - in the presence of
heterogeneous workers and jobs, as well as costs of adjustment - explain why some job-seeking
workers remain unemployed and some vacant jobs remain un￿lled.
Needless to say, the incentive models presented above are merely a ￿rst step towards
a choice-theoretic understanding of the matching process. Much research remains to be
done. Although relaxing our simplifying assumptions regarding wage determination, hetero-
geneities and adjustment costs will not a⁄ect the basic idea above, it will help us re￿ne the
quantitative predictive properties of the incentive model.
Nevertheless, we have shown that even on the basis of our radically simplifying assump-
tions, our calibrated incentive model can account for various important empirical regularities
that have eluded the conventional matching models. In particular, our model comes close
to generating the empirically observed volatilities of the unemployment rate, the job ￿nding
rate and the separation rate. Furthermore, our model can also account for the observed
strong negative correlations between the job ￿nding rate and the unemployment rate, and
between job creation and job destruction.
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A Appendix: Vacancies
Suppose that by posting vacancies, the ￿rm can reduce its subsequent screening costs, which
are a component of hiring costs. Speci￿cally, let the vacancy posting cost be ￿ per vacancy
and let the hiring cost be h = 1
￿v￿￿, where v is the number of vacancies posted and ￿ is
a positive constant. Assuming that the ￿rm makes its vacancy posting decision before the
realization of " is known, the ￿rm sets the number of vacancies to maximize its expected
pro￿t E (￿) = ￿(a ￿ w ￿ h ￿ E (")) ￿ ￿v. Since E (") = 0, the pro￿t-maximizing number








Table 5 provides a robustness analysis of the labor market volatilities implied by our model
for values of the ￿ring cost f = 0:08 and f = 0:20.
U. Rate Match. Rate Sep. Rate Product.
Volatilities for f= 0:08
Standard deviation 0.23 0.14 0.09 0.02
Relative to productivity 10.7 6.6 4.4 1
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.88
Volatilities for f= 0:2
Standard deviation 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.02
Relative to productivity 5.2 4.5 1.5 1
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.88
Table 5: Robustness Analysis of the Labor Market Volatilities Implied by our Model for
Values of the Firing Cost f = 0:08 and f = 0:20:
26